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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Seeking to remain in this country, Chiao Fang Ku 
petitions for review of a final order of removal issued by the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”).  The 
Board determined that Ku had committed an aggravated felony 
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under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) because her prior 
conviction for wire fraud constituted an offense involving 
fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victims exceeded 
$10,000.  The Board also found that Ku’s wire fraud conviction 
constituted a “crime involving moral turpitude” under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) such that, without a waiver, she is 
ineligible for an adjustment of status.  Although the 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) granted Ku a waiver of 
inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B) based on the 
extreme hardship that her deportation would cause her U.S. 
Citizen children, the Board reversed that decision.  Ku 
challenges each of the Board’s decisions. 
In Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009), the Court 
held that determination of whether a fraud offense involved 
loss to the victims of $10,000 or more requires a circumstance-
specific approach, allowing the immigration court to review 
both the charging document and sentencing-related materials 
to determine the loss amount attributable to the offense.  On 
the facts of this case, we find that the undisputed loss to the 
victims of well over $10,000 was sufficiently tethered to Ku’s 
wire fraud conviction such that the conviction qualifies as an 
aggravated felony.  Furthermore, we find no error in the 
Board’s determination that wire fraud constitutes a crime of 
moral turpitude.  Lastly, regarding the waiver of admissibility, 
we do not have jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial 
of a waiver under § 212(h) of the INA.  Accordingly, we will 
deny in part and dismiss in part Ku’s petition for review. 
I. 
 Ku is a native and citizen of Taiwan.  She was admitted 
to the United States in 1997 and gained status as a lawful 
permanent resident in 2002.  In 2014, Ku was charged with a 
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single count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.  
Ku waived her right to an indictment and was charged by 
information only. The Information alleged that Ku was tasked 
with managing the finances of her in-laws, E.R. and M.R, and 
that she was provided access to her in-laws’ bank accounts in 
connection with this role.  The Information further alleged that, 
between May 2008 and July 2013, Ku defrauded her in-laws 
by using her access to their accounts to take money from them 
for her personal use.  In particular, it alleged that Ku: (1) 
transferred funds from her in-laws’ accounts to her own 
accounts; (2) withdrew funds from her in-laws’ accounts as 
cash; (3) made payments from her in-laws’ accounts to pay off 
her personal credit cards; (4) wrote and cashed checks payable 
to herself by forging her mother-in-law’s signature; and (5) 
fraudulently applied for and obtained credit cards in her 
mother-in-law’s name and used them for her own purposes.  
The Information alleged that, in total, Ku stole more than 
$950,000 from her in-laws. 
 These allegations were incorporated by reference into 
the sole count of the Information, which alleged that, on or 
about November 7, 2011, Ku, 
having devised and intending to devise a 
scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain 
money and property by means of materially 
false and fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, and promises, did cause 
writings, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds 
to be transmitted by means of wire 
communications in interstate commerce for 
the purpose of executing such scheme and 
artifice, to wit: executing an online payment 
from M.R.’s Sovereign Bank account, ending 
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in 8497, to the defendant’s Chase credit card 
account, ending in 6567, in the amount of 
$2,290.53. 
(App. 590).  The Information further contained forfeiture 
allegations, which directed that, upon conviction of the sole 
count of the Information, Ku “forfeit to the United States . . . 
any property, real or personal, that constitutes, or is derived 
from, proceeds traceable to the commission of the offense, 
including but not limited to at least $950,000 in United States 
currency.” (App. 591). 
 Ku pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement,1 to the 
single count of the Information.  In her sentencing 
memorandum, Ku, through counsel, acknowledged that she 
was “now subject to automatic deportation as a result of her 
conviction in this case.”  (App. 740).  Ku was ultimately 
sentenced to a term of 18 months’ imprisonment, followed by 
one year of supervised release.  The judgment includes a total 
loss determination of $954,515.71 and orders restitution in that 
amount.  (App. 582). 
 After Ku completed her sentence, she was served with 
a Notice to Appear and placed in removal proceedings.  The 
Notice to Appear charged Ku with being removable under 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA” or the “Act”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an 
individual convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  The Immigration Judge 
concluded that Ku was removable as charged because the 
                                              
 1 The plea agreement is not part of the administrative 
record before us, nor was it in the record before the IJ or BIA. 
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record of conviction substantiated a finding that the wire fraud 
involved a loss of more than $10,000. 
In order to avoid deportation, Ku sought to re-adjust her 
status based on her U.S. Citizen husband.2  The Immigration 
Judge granted Ku’s application for a waiver of inadmissibility 
under § 212(h)(1)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B), 
based on the extreme hardship that her deportation would cause 
her U.S. Citizen children, and granted Ku’s adjustment of 
status pursuant to § 245(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). 
 On appeal, the Board affirmed that the Government 
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Ku was 
removable as an aggravated felon as defined at 
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) in that her offense involved fraud or deceit 
in which the loss to the victims exceeded $10,000.  In doing so, 
the Board noted that the Information alleged that Ku stole more 
than $950,000 in funds belonging to her in-laws, and that this 
allegation was incorporated by reference into the count to 
which Ku pleaded guilty.  It also observed that the Information 
also contained a forfeiture allegation stating that, upon 
conviction, Ku would forfeit over $950,000 in currency.  
Finally, the Board considered relevant that the Judgment of 
Conviction found a total loss of over $950,000 and ordered 
restitution in that amount. 
 The Board further concluded that Ku’s conviction was 
for a crime involving moral turpitude, making her inadmissible 
under § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), such that she required a § 212(h) waiver 
                                              
2 Ku's present husband is not the man to whom she was 




in order to adjust her status.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (providing 
for adjustment of status of certain aliens to that of an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence); see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(h)(1)(B) (providing for waiver of inadmissibility at the 
discretion of the Attorney General).  Although it acknowledged 
the hardship posed to her family, the Board ultimately found 
that, given the severity of her crime, Ku did not merit a 
§ 212(h) waiver.  It accordingly vacated the decision of the IJ 
and denied Ku’s applications for a § 212(h) waiver and for 
adjustment of status.  Ku timely filed a petition for review. 
II. 
 Although we have jurisdiction to review final orders of 
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a),3 “no court shall have 
                                              
 3 We have taken a broad view of what constitutes a 
“final order of removal” under § 1252.  Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 
655 F.3d 333, 337–38 (3d Cir. 2011).  “[A]n order is final for 
jurisdictional purposes when a removability determination has 
been made that is no longer appealable to the BIA, regardless 
[of] whether a formal order of removal has been entered.” Id. 
(quoting Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir. 
2008)); see also Shehu v. Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 652, 656 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“[D]enial of a . . . petition for asylum, withholding 
of removal, and relief under the [Convention Against Torture] 
constitutes ‘a final order of removal’ within the meaning of 
[§ 1252], [because] the alien is entitled to no further process 
before deportation.”).  Here, although the Board did not 
explicitly order Ku removed to Taiwan, it found her removable 
and denied her application for adjustment of status, her only 
petition for relief.  (App. 5).  Furthermore, the Board sustained 
DHS’s appeal, which requested that Ku be ordered removed to 
Taiwan.  Accordingly, for the purposes of this appeal, we 
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jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an 
alien who is removable by reason of having committed [an 
aggravated felony].”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  “We do, 
however, have jurisdiction to examine ‘constitutional claims or 
questions of law.’”  Fan Wang v. Att’y Gen., 898 F.3d 341, 343 
(3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Catwell v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 199, 
205 (3d Cir. 2010); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)).  Therefore, we 
have authority to take up the issue, applying plenary review, of 
whether Ku’s conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony 
because it is “a purely legal question, and one that governs our 
own jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 
203, 207 (3d Cir. 2002)).  We also review de novo the legal 
question of what elements of a federal criminal statute 
implicate moral turpitude, while affording Chevron deference 
to the Board’s definition of “moral turpitude.”  Knapik v. 
Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 88 (3d Cir. 2004). 
III. 
 On appeal, Ku challenges all three aspects of the BIA’s 
order.  First, she contends that the BIA incorrectly determined 
that her wire-fraud conviction involved a loss of more than 
$10,000 by relying on evidence that was not sufficiently 
tethered to the sole count of conviction.4  Second, Ku argues 
                                              
consider the Board’s order to be a final order of removal.  The 
Government’s motion to remand this case to the Board for 
issuance of an order directing that Ku be removed to Taiwan 
and to allow the IJ to make additional findings on removability 
will be denied as moot. 
 
 4 We note that Ku does not challenge—and did not 
challenge before the IJ or the Board—that her wire fraud 
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that the Board erred in finding that her wire-fraud conviction 
was for a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute 
of conviction does not require a showing of intent.  Third, Ku 
asserts that the BIA applied the incorrect legal standard in 
reversing the IJ’s grant of a discretionary waiver of 
inadmissibility.  We reject all three of Ku’s challenges and 
therefore deny the petition for review. 
A. 
Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, as amended, 
provides that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated 
felony at any time after admission is deportable.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  The Act defines “aggravated felony,” in 
relevant part, as an offense that “involves fraud or deceit in 
which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). 
In Nijhawan v. Holder, the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of whether the $10,000 threshold of the aggravated 
felony statute “refers to an element of a fraud statute or to the 
factual circumstances surrounding commission of the crime on 
a specific occasion.”  557 U.S. at 33.  The Court adopted the 
latter interpretation, characterizing the review as examining 
“the specific way in which an offender committed the crime on 
a specific occasion.”  Id. at 34.  The Court distinguished the 
“circumstance-specific approach” to be used in determining 
whether a crime “involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to 
the victim or victims exceeds $10,000” from the “categorical 
approach” used in determining whether a crime is a “violent 
felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 
                                              




U.S.C. § 924(e).  Id. at 34–40.  It also rejected the use of the 
so-called “modified categorical approach” employed in some 
contexts, which would limit an IJ’s consideration to charging 
documents, jury instructions, special jury findings, or some 
equivalent judge-made findings and—in the case of a guilty 
plea—to the written plea documents or plea colloquy.  Id. at 
41.  While the Supreme Court acknowledged that “the statute 
foresees the use of fundamentally fair procedures,” it rejected 
the argument that fairness requires such evidentiary 
limitations.  Id.  Accordingly, it found “nothing unfair” about 
the IJ’s reliance upon the defendant’s stipulation and the 
district court’s restitution order to determine that the crime at 
issue was an “aggravated felony” under § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  
Id. at 42–43.  
 Since Nijhawan, we have consistently applied the 
circumstance-specific approach to determine the amount of 
loss in “aggravated felony” cases.  See, e.g., Kaplun v. Att’y 
Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 265–66 (3d Cir. 2010); Doe v. Att’y Gen., 
659 F.3d 266, 274–76 (3d Cir. 2011).  Most recently, we 
addressed the issue in Fan Wang, in which we reviewed “not 
only those documents that may be considered in a modified 
categorical approach (the indictment, plea agreement, and 
judgment),” but also others, including “the presentence 
investigation report and any sentencing-related material.”  898 
F.3d at 348–49 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Relying on Nijhawan, we reasoned that 
consideration of such materials “is appropriate so long as the 
petitioner has been given a ‘fair opportunity’ to challenge the 
Government’s claim.”  Id. at 349 (quoting Nijhawan, 557 U.S. 
at 41).  Accordingly, we determined that the Board did not go 
beyond the bounds of proper review by examining the record—
including the sole count of the superseding information, the 
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plea colloquy, the presentence investigation report, the “total 
loss” specified in the judgment, and the restitution order—to 
determine whether the petitioner’s prior conviction was an 
“aggravated felony.”  Id. at 349–50.  In determining the proper 
amount of loss in that case, we were persuaded by the 
Government’s argument that the loss amount listed in the 
judgment and restitution order was “undeniably tethered” to 
the conduct for which the petitioner was convicted.  Id. at 351. 
 We consider the loss to the victims in this case—as 
evidenced by the Information, Judgment, and Restitution 
Order—to be sufficiently tethered to the count of conviction 
such that Ku’s conviction was an aggravated felony.  
Paragraphs 1 through 10 of the Information allege that Ku stole 
more than $950,000 in funds belonging to her in-laws, and 
these paragraphs were incorporated by reference into the count 
to which Ku pleaded guilty.  Furthermore, the forfeiture 
allegation contained in the Information states that, upon 
conviction, Ku would forfeit the “proceeds traceable to the 
commission of the offense, including but not limited to at least 
$950,000 in United States currency.”  (App. 591).  Finally, the 
Judgment of Conviction indicates a loss of $954,515.71 and 
orders restitution in that amount.  Each of these documents is 
reviewable under the circumstance-specific approach laid out 
by the Supreme Court in Nijhawan.  Together, they provide 
clear and convincing evidence that Ku’s offense involved a 
loss of over $10,000.  Nonetheless, we briefly addresses Ku’s 
arguments to the contrary, all of which lack merit. 
1. 
First, Ku contends that the circumstance-specific 
approach described in Nijhawan does not apply in her case 
because the single count of the Information made clear that it 
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was for the specified amount of $2,290.53.  She urges us to 
read Nijhawan to have kept intact the modified categorical 
approach for cases in which the charging document contains a 
clear indication of the loss amount.  Under the modified 
categorical approach, she contends, the Board was correct in 
reviewing the Information but, because the count of conviction 
contains a loss amount of $2,290.53, the Board should have 
stopped there. 
Contrary to Ku’s assertion, Nijhawan does not stand for 
the proposition that, when the count of conviction contains a 
loss amount, immigration officials must look no further.  The 
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the use of the modified 
categorical approach in determining whether a prior conviction 
is an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  Nijhawan, 
557 U.S. at 41–42; see also Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 265–66 
(interpreting Nijhawan).  Rather, it determined that the 
circumstance-specific approach is required because the 
aggravated felony statute “refers to the particular 
circumstances in which an offender committed a (more broadly 
defined) fraud or deceit crime on a particular occasion,” and 
not to an element of the offense.  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 32.  
Noting that the Government in immigration proceedings is 
held only to a “clear and convincing” burden of proof, and not 
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” the Supreme Court found 
“nothing unfair about [an IJ] rel[ying] upon earlier sentencing-
related material”—in that case a sentencing stipulation and 
restitution order.  Id. at 42–43.  It also noted that “the sole 
purpose of the aggravated felony inquiry is to ascertain the 
nature of a prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate 
the conviction itself.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
Nothing in Nijhawan suggests that the circumstance-
specific approach applies in some cases but not others, or that 
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the documents reviewable under that approach vary from case 
to case.  Furthermore, we have consistently interpreted 
Nijhawan as allowing an IJ, in determining the loss amount, to 
look beyond the charging document to sentencing-related 
materials.  See Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 265–66; Fan Wang, 898 
F.3d at 348–49.  Ku has not persuaded us that our reading is 
incorrect. 
2. 
Second, Ku contends that, because her conviction was 
for “a single act of a $2,290.53 on-line transfer,” the losses she 
caused through other acts and transactions are not sufficiently 
“tethered” to the count of conviction for purposes of the 
aggravated felony statute.  (Petitioner’s Br. at 27).  In doing so, 
Ku asks us to read the Information as charging her in Count 
One with a “scheme and artifice to defraud” her in-laws of 
$2,290.53, and not as charging her with one instance of wire 
fraud that was part of a broader “scheme and artifice to 
defraud” her in-laws of over $950,000.  However, such an 
interpretation is inconsistent with the language of the 
Information.  In Count One, the Government “re-alleges and 
incorporates by reference” the first eight paragraphs, which 
allege that, over five years, Ku defrauded her in-laws of more 
than $950,000 by transferring funds from their accounts to her 
own accounts, withdrawing funds as cash, making payments to 
credit card companies for charges she incurred, and writing and 
cashing checks payable to herself.  (App. 588–90). The explicit 
incorporation of those paragraphs into the count to which Ku 
pleaded guilty supports an interpretation of the count itself as 
describing Ku’s “scheme and artifice to defraud” her in-laws 
of more than $950,000. 
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We are similarly unpersuaded by Ku’s contention that, 
because Paragraphs 1 through 8 of the Information describe 
conduct that does not necessarily amount to wire fraud, such 
conduct cannot count toward the total loss resulting from her 
conviction.  It is incontrovertible that the  “scheme and artifice 
to defraud” charged in Count One of the Information 
encompassed the whole course of Ku’s unlawful conduct, 
including the one incident in which Ku committed wire fraud 
in the amount of $2,390.53, and which resulted in a total loss 
of over $950,000.  In short, because Ku pleaded guilty to 
committing wire fraud as part of a scheme to defraud her in-
laws of more than $950,000, the total loss amount is, to use our 
language from Fan Wang, “undeniably tethered” to her wire 
fraud conviction. 
3. 
Finally, Ku contends that the single-count Information 
to which she pleaded guilty is part of the “justice package” 
worked out between her and the Government and urges the 
Court to defer to that agreement.  (Petitioner’s Br. at 35).  In 
doing so, Ku relies on our opinion in Alaka v. Attorney 
General, 456 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2006).  However, the facts of 
this case make it distinguishable from Alaka. 
In Alaka—which we decided prior to Nijhawan5—we 
held that the IJ erred by considering the amount of intended 
                                              
 5 Because Alaka was decided prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Nijhawan, its application of the modified 
categorical approach to the aggravated-felony analysis does 
not affect our decision.  However, to the extent that Alaka 
stands for the proposition that an IJ may not consider dismissed 
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loss for all of the charges against the petitioner rather than the 
single count for which she was convicted.  Alaka, 456 F.3d at 
106.  The petitioner had been indicted on three counts for 
conduct involving fraudulent checks, but was convicted of only 
one count, for which the actual loss was $4,716.68.  Id. at 92.  
The sentencing court nonetheless held that the petitioner’s 
conduct was part of a “common scheme or plan,” and therefore 
found the total intended loss to be nearly $50,000.  Id.  It 
ordered her to pay $4,716.68 in restitution.  Id.  In subsequent 
immigration proceedings, the IJ concluded that the petitioner 
had been convicted of an aggravated felony on the ground that 
the intended loss was more than $10,000.  Id. at 105, n.27.  On 
appeal, we determined that, while the IJ properly considered 
the factual findings of the sentencing report in determining 
whether the offense was an aggravated felony, the loss amount 
tied to the dismissed charges was not properly considered as 
part of the aggravated-felony analysis.  Id. at 106–08.  In doing 
so, we noted that “the plain and unambiguous language of the 
statute . . . predicates removal on a convicted offense resulting 
in losses greater than $10,000,” thereby foreclosing inclusion 
of losses stemming from unconvicted offenses.  Id. 106–07 
(citations omitted).  Furthermore, we considered that, because 
it is “the plea agreement that establishes the offense for which 
the defendant will be convicted, it is to that agreement, and not 
the indictment or the sentence, that we look in determining the 
intended loss.”  Id. at 107.  The petitioner “unmistakably pled 
guilty to one count, and the plea agreement plainly documented 
that loss at less than $10,000.”  Id. at 108 (citations and 
alterations omitted).  Because the plea agreement “spell[ed] it 
out for us in black and white,” we concluded that the plea 
                                              
charges when calculating the loss attributable to the conviction, 
it remains good law.  
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agreement alone established the loss amount, and “not . . . the 
loss charged in the indictment, tabulated for restitution 
purposes, or calculated for sentencing.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
Here, in stark contrast to the petitioner in Alaka, the 
record before us contains no plea agreement, and certainly not 
one which explicitly spells out the loss amount to which Ku 
pleaded guilty.  Instead, Ku urges us to find that, based on the 
fact that the Government could have charged her with a much 
longer list of crimes but did not, the loss amount as indicated 
in Count One was part of an explicit bargain between her and 
the Government.  However, this argument is based on pure 
conjecture.  Absent a clear and unmistakable indication of loss 
in a written plea agreement, we are left with only the 
Information, Judgment, and Restitution Order to determine the 
loss attributable to Ku’s conviction.  As explained above, these 
documents, taken together, provide clear and convincing 
evidence that the loss amount attributable to Ku’s wire fraud 
conviction exceeded $10,000, and Ku has provided no plea 
agreement or any other document to the contrary.6 
                                              
 6 The sentencing court in Alaka calculated the total loss 
amount based on the “common scheme or plan,” which, it 
considered, included both the count of conviction and the 
dismissed counts, and we considered the IJ’s reliance on that 
calculation to be in error in light of the plea agreement.  456 
F.3d at 106.  But this does not help Ku.  As explained above, 
the wire fraud count to which Ku pleaded guilty was based in 
part on her “scheme and artifice to defraud” her in-laws of over 
$950,000.  (App. 590).  Unlike the sentencing court in Alaka, 
the sentencing court in this case did not base its loss calculation 




Ku’s argument that this Court should respect the 
“justice package” between her and the Government also 
touches on the Supreme Court’s landmark holdings in Padilla 
v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), and Descamps v. United 
States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013), both of which, she argues, counsel 
toward respecting agreements between criminal defendants 
and the Government with respect to the collateral 
consequences of a conviction.  But this line of argument merely 
highlights another critical shortcoming of Ku’s case.  To the 
extent Ku argues that the Information was designed 
specifically to avoid immigration consequences, there is no 
evidence in the record to support such a finding.  Indeed, Ku’s 
attorney indicated in her sentencing memorandum that Ku “is 
now subject to automatic deportation as a result of her 
conviction in this case.”  (App. 740).  This statement, while not 
conclusive, certainly undermines any assertion that the “justice 
package” referred to by Ku was designed to avoid an 
aggravated felony conviction.  Indeed, absent any other 
evidence in the record to the contrary, the sentencing 
memorandum supports a finding that, at the time of her guilty 
plea, Ku understood that she was pleading guilty to an 
aggravated felony. 
B. 
 Having concluded that the Board did not err in finding 
that Ku was convicted of an aggravated felony, we turn to the 
question of whether Ku’s conviction constituted a “crime 
involving moral turpitude” under the INA.  Ku argues that wire 
fraud is not a “crime involving moral turpitude” under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) because it does not include as an element 
the specific intent to defraud.  This is incorrect. 
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The statute provides that a person is guilty of wire fraud 
if, “having devised or intending to devise any scheme or 
artifice to defraud,” that person “transmits or causes to be 
transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television 
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any 
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of 
executing such scheme or artifice.”  18 U.S.C. § 1343.  Courts 
have long treated fraud crimes as “involving moral turpitude.”  
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (“[T]he 
decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an 
ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral 
turpitude.”); Singh v. Att’y Gen., 807 F.3d 547, 550 (3d Cir. 
2015) (“Crimes . . . involving allegations of dishonesty or fraud 
fall well within the recognized definition of ‘crimes involving 
moral turpitude.’”).  Furthermore, we have also consistently 
read the wire fraud statute as containing the element of specific 
intent.  See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 518 
(3d Cir. 2012) (“To prove wire fraud, the Government must 
establish (1) the defendant’s knowing and willful participation 
in a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with the specific intent to 
defraud, and (3) the use of . . . interstate wire communications 
in furtherance of the scheme.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (emphasis added).   
Seeking to persuade us to revisit these tenets, Ku asks 
us to read the statutory terms “having devised” and “intending 
to devise” as disjunctive means of committing wire fraud, the 
latter containing the mens rea of intent, and the former 
eschewing any mens rea at all.  But the language of the statute 
does not lend itself to such an interpretation.  The specific 
intent requirement is contained in the latter part of the statute—
“for the purpose of executing [a] scheme or artifice [to 
defraud]”—and must be proved regardless of whether the 
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person made the transmission after “having devised” or while 
“intending to devise” the scheme to defraud.  18 U.S.C. § 1343.  
Plainly read, the language Ku seizes on, “having devised or 
intending to devise,” refers not to the requisite mens rea but to 
the temporal relationship between the formation of the fraud 
scheme and the transmission itself.  Either way, the person 
must have made the transmission for the purpose of executing 
the fraud scheme in order to be convicted. 
Ku’s statutory interpretation argument holds no weight.  
Accordingly, we see no need to revisit the long-held tenet that 
fraud crimes—including wire fraud—are crimes involving 
moral turpitude under the INA. 
C. 
 Finally, Ku asks us to find that the Board committed 
error in its reversal of the IJ’s finding that she was eligible for 
a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility based on the hardship 
her deportation would cause her U.S. citizen children.  
However, we lack jurisdiction over the Board’s decision on 
this point. 
The INA provides that an alien is inadmissible to the 
United States if she has been convicted of a crime involving 
moral turpitude.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  The Act also 
provides, however, that the Attorney General may waive 
inadmissibility to allow an applicant to obtain adjustment of 
status under § 1182(h), “if the alien is a spouse, parent, or child 
of a United States citizen . . . and can show that denial of 
admission would cause extreme hardship to the citizen . . . .”  
De Leon–Reynoso v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 
2002).  The authority to waive one or more grounds of 
inadmissibility is vested solely in the Attorney General and “no 
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court shall have jurisdiction to review” a decision to deny such 
a request. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). 
We may, however, review “constitutional claims or 
questions of law raised upon a petition for review . . . .”  Id. at 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).  Our jurisdiction in that respect is “narrowly 
circumscribed” in that it is limited to “colorable claims or 
questions of law.” Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
While “[t]he question of our jurisdiction over a colorable legal 
claim does not turn on whether that claim is ultimately 
meritorious . . . , a party may not dress up a claim with legal 
clothing to invoke this Court's jurisdiction.” Pareja v. Att’y 
Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 
Ku argues that we have jurisdiction to consider her 
petition for review on the waiver issue because it presents a 
question of law, namely whether the Board applied the proper 
legal standard in making the discretionary determination.  But 
Ku’s argument boils down to her contention that the Board 
failed to consider certain equities relevant to the hardship 
determination.  As we have consistently held, “arguments such 
as that an Immigration Judge or the BIA incorrectly weighed 
evidence, failed to consider evidence or improperly weighed 
equitable factors are not questions of law under 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).”  Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 
(3d Cir. 2007).  Because the substance of Ku’s petition for 
review amounts to contesting the weight the Board should have 
given to the positive equities of her case, we do not have 





 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny in part and 
dismiss in part Ku's petition for review, and we will deny as 
moot the Government's motion to remand.   
